A Report Came Out Detailing the Failures of U.S. Steel During the Incident That Left Two Workers Dead
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board has released its final report into the deadly explosion at U.S. Steel’s Clairton Coke Plant, finding it was the result of multiple preventable safety issues. The report, released one day shy of a year since the explosion, faults the company, saying the explosion that killed two and injured 11 others “should never have happened.” It cites the outcome of the deadly explosion being the result of the absence of a formalized procedure, the proximity of the buildings employees work out of to where dangerous processes take place, and what the report refers to as an ineffective process safety management system.
It was concluded that the incident was a result of workers routinely performing a task incorrectly over a period of years until it ultimately led to a catastrophic explosion. Companies need to outline procedures for any task that could potentially cause harm to workers and make sure that workers are fully trained on those procedures. The report faults U.S. Steel for not having a formal procedure for a safe or proper way to complete the specific valve-cleaning process that caused the explosion.
Workers from U.S. Steel and its contractor MPW Industrial Services were cleaning a 70-year-old valve when the valve broke, leading to coke oven gas igniting and exploding. It was reported after the fact that workers had used water and significantly overpressurized the valve, leading to its failure. There was no procedure describing the correct or proper pressure, or safe way to do that operation, and the operation was done in a way that led to its direct failure.
In the days and weeks before the explosion, investigators say it’s what wasn’t thought about that ended in the result of an explosion. No one thought about the safety of the operation. A valve rated for 50 pounds of pressure was hooked up to a pump truck that far exceeded 50 pounds. The CSB report says the workers had been cleaning the valves wrong for years.
When asked why it had not failed before the explosion, the investigator did not have a good answer. But they do know that for the valve to fail, the valve had to be closed or nearly closed. That would prevent the water that was being used to clean the valve from getting out. The board concluded that a formal procedure for using water to clean valves wasn’t drawn up despite U.S. Steel management being aware of and endorsing the practice.
Even if the company was not required to do it by regulation, it still should have been done because now two employees were fatally injured during the incident, and if everything had been done correctly, two people might still be alive. The Chemical Safety Board made multiple recommendations. They include evaluating those distances between buildings and hazardous processes, developing a written procedure for washing valves with pressurized water, and developing a comprehensive process safety management system. U.S. Steel made a statement thanking the Chemical Safety Board and also said it would thoroughly review its recommendations.
U.S. Steel also outlined several safety protocols they say they have already strengthened, including establishing standardized best practices for valve cleaning, improving their management of change program and having workers complete comprehensive training related to those changes. In remembrance of the explosion, along with lowering flags and a moment of silence, U.S. Steel will gather for safety discussions, saying the best way to honor their fallen colleagues is to make sure everyone returns home in the future. A spokesman says they will continue to remember their colleagues and keep their families and loved ones in their thoughts.
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